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FULL DISCLOSURE: MOVING BEYOND
DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS TO
AFFIRMATIVE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
ABSTRACT
In the period following the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), which compelled the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
engage in substantial rulemaking. The Dodd-Frank mandate in Section
953(b) required the SEC to promulgate a rule, which it eventually finalized
and is currently known as Pay Ratio Disclosure. Historically, SEC
rulemaking has received great deference when rules are judicially
challenged. However, following the passage of Dodd-Frank, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has begun to grant less deference to SEC rulemaking where
it has found that the SEC has not engaged in a proper cost-benefit analysis,
and subsequently has invalidated a number of SEC rules. The Pay Ratio
Disclosure requires publicly held companies to file: (1) the median of the
annual total compensation of all the employees employed by the publicly held
company, or registrant; (2) the annual total compensation of the registrant’s
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or equivalent executive officer; and (3) in
ratio form, the amount of the CEO compensation to the median employee
pay. Since the Pay Ratio Disclosure’s first proposal it has been met with
criticism from both business organizations who have previously challenged
other SEC rulemakings, as well as Republican members of Congress and
Republican Commissioners of the SEC. This Note argues that Pay Ratio
Disclosure, due to its burdensome compliance costs coupled with its lack of
tangible benefits, should be invalidated. Further, this Note recommends that
in place of Pay Ratio Disclosure, Congress should direct the SEC to
promulgate a rule subjecting CEOs of publicly held companies to a soft pay
cap.
INTRODUCTION
“The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from
the Government, and I’m here to help.”1
Five years after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) into law, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) finalized and adopted,2 pursuant to Section
1. Ronald Reagan, President, The President’s News Conference, THE AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Aug. 12, 1986), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37733.
2. The SEC adopted the Pay Ratio Disclosure, by a three to two vote. SEC Chair, Mary Jo
White and Commissioners, Luis A. Aguilar and Kara Stein, voted in favor of the Pay Ratio
Disclosure, while Republican Commissioners, Michael Piwowar and Daniel Gallagher, dissented.
See Brian J. Lane et. al., SEC Adopts Final CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rules, GIBSON DUNN (Aug.
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953(b), what has become known as the Pay Ratio Disclosure (the Rule).3
Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to adopt amendments to Item
402 of Regulation S-K to implement Section 953(b).4 Pursuant to Section
953(b), the SEC was required to establish a rule that mandated publicly held
companies to file: (1) the median of the annual total compensation of all the
employees employed by the publicly held company, or registrant; (2) the
annual total compensation of the registrant’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
or equivalent executive officer; and (3) in ratio form, the amount of the CEO
compensation to the median employee pay.5
Following the Congressional mandate, the SEC developed the Pay Ratio
Disclosure to implement Section 953(b).6 The Pay Ratio Disclosure operates
in two ways: (1) it implements Section 953(b) by requiring publicly held
companies to file with the SEC the three components of Section 953(b);7 and
(2) it provides guidance to the registrant companies regarding compliance
with the Rule.8 The SEC, in its public release adopting the Pay Ratio
Disclosure, stated that the Rule was “intended to provide shareholders with a
company-specific metric that can assist in their evaluation of a registrant’s
executive compensation practice.”9 Thus, the intent of the Pay Ratio
Disclosure was to provide “a complement to other executive compensation
rules . . . that promote corporate accountability and enhance the information
available to investors . . . in a manner that is reasonable and workable for
issuers, while still providing for increased transparency and greater
accountability in executive compensation matters.”10
However, no matter how eloquently phrased and beneficial the Pay Ratio
Disclosure was designed to be, there was at the time of proposal, and
continues to be following its finalization, substantial pushback, particularly
from Republicans in Congress, Republican SEC Commissioners, and
business organizations, who have successfully challenged other SEC

6, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/SEC-Adopts-Final-CEO-PayRatio-Disclosure-Rules.pdf; see also Kevin McCoy, SEC Approves ‘Pay Ratio’ Disclosure for
CEOs, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/08/05/
sec-pay-ratio-disclosure-vote/31112725/.
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub L. No.
111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)); see also
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75,610, 80 Fed.
Reg. 50,104, 50,184–86 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
4. Dodd-Frank, § 953(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
5. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed Reg. at 50,184.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement, The CEO Pay Ratio
Disclosure: A Workable Solution For Both Issuers and Investors (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.
gov/news/statement/statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html.
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rulemakings in the past.11 Indeed, “[no] corporate governance issue captures
the imagination and frustration of the American public and politicians more
than executive compensation.”12 The Pay Ratio Disclosure has proven to be
no exception to this concept,13 as former SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar
noted: “[t]he Congressional mandate under Section 953(b) has proven to be
one of the most controversial rules that the Commission has been required to
undertake under the Dodd-Frank Act.”14
The Pay Ratio Disclosure is greatly controversial in the political arena.15
More specifically, there is a partisan split between special interest groups,16
that seek to use the federal government to regulate executive compensation,
and those who feel that, for various reasons, corporate governance should be
left to state law.17 Both the Pay Ratio Disclosure and the SEC have come
under intense criticism, as some have commented that the Rule purports to
do nothing more than “name and shame”18 the highest executives of publicly
11. See Donald Kalfen, SEC Issues Final Rule on CEO Pay Ratio, MERIDIAN COMPENSATION
PARTNERS LLC (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.meridiancp.com/insights/news/sec-issues-final-ruleon-ceo-pay-ratio-2/ (noting that since the adoption of the finalized Pay Ratio Disclosure there has
been “withering criticism” from business organizations, Republicans in Congress, and Republican
SEC Commissioners); see also Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting
Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html; Daniel M.
Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting to Adopt the
“Pay Ratio Disclosure” (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statementat-open-meeting-to-adopt-the-pay-ratio-rule.html; The Warren Commission, An SEC Rule on CEO
Pay Designed as a Political Weapon, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015, 6:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-warren-commission-1438814488?cb=logged0.9143685468006879 (stating “[w]e have
here the perfect progressive policy. Possibly wasteful and irrelevant, but to the extent it affects the
behavior of corporate executives, it provides an incentive not to hire the people its sponsors claim
to be helping”); Katie Johnston, New Rule Could Fuel Debate Over CEO Pay, BOS. GLOBE (Aug.
5, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/08/05/how-much-more-does-ceo-make-you
-may-find-out/Vl5Bz6T3k3jgJNba7gzJAK/story.html (“[Pay Ratio] will impose on companies and
their shareholders an extremely costly and burdensome requirement, and compel companies to
disclose immaterial, if not misleading, information.” (quoting Mike Ryan, Vice President of Corp.
Governance, Business Roundtable)).
12. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 302 (2009).
13. See generally GARY SHORTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE “PAY RATIO
PROVISION” IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT: LEGISLATION TO REPEAL IT IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 21
(2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43262.pdf; see also Piwowar, supra note 11.
14. Aguilar, supra note 10.
15. Piwowar, supra note 11; see also Gallagher, supra note 11; The Warren Commission, supra
note 11.
16. The AFL-CIO represents one of the largest voices in support of the Pay Ratio Disclosure.
See Gallagher, supra note 11; see also Letter from Brandon J. Rees, Acting Dir., Office of Inv. for
the Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Org. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Dec. 2, 2013) (supporting the proposed Pay Ratio Disclosure).
17. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out Of
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013).
18. Piwowar, supra note 11. The SEC received countless comments following its initial proposal
of the Pay Ratio Disclosure, and further, media sources which will be discussed in greater depth
below have adopted the term “name and shame” or more simply, “corporate shaming.” Id. This
Note asserts in Sections II and V that this criticism is valid.
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held companies, in an effort to force these companies to reign in executive
compensation. Critics further argue that the Pay Ratio Disclosure provides
no substantive value to the shareholders it purports to aid.
Moreover, marking a sea change from the traditional deference courts
gave agency rulemaking under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc., the D.C. Circuit has invalidated a number of SEC rules,
where, in the Court’s view, the SEC failed to adequately consider the
statutory and economic consequences of the proposed regulation.19 The
enactment of the Pay Ratio Disclosure, coupled with its lack of tangible
benefits and the D.C. Circuit’s cost-benefit standard, leaves the Pay Ratio
Disclosure ripe for invalidation. Finally, the SEC has been criticized for its
timing in finalizing the Pay Ratio Disclosure, as Congress did not impose a
deadline upon the SEC to furnish the rule as it did with many other mandates
pursuant to Dodd-Frank.20
This Note argues that the SEC’s Pay Ratio Disclosure should not survive
judicial scrutiny under the requisite cost-benefit analysis standard employed
by the D.C. Circuit. This Note further recommends that Congress repeal
Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank and direct the SEC to promulgate a new rule
that employs the use of a soft pay cap to better combat excessive executive
compensation. A soft pay cap would require the SEC to annually set a
numerical percentage that restricts a company from compensating the CEO
above the set percentage. Unlike a strict pay cap, which sets a hard and fast
absolute restriction on compensation, the soft cap would be contingent upon
two factors: (1) the average net profit of the company over the previous three
years and (2) the independent compensation committee’s good faith
prediction regarding the future business endeavors of the company. A soft
pay cap thus results in a less costly endeavor than the Pay Ratio Disclosure,
as it requires the use of readily available information while better confronting
executive compensation issues and maintaining capital formation,
competition, and efficiency.
Part I of this Note discusses in depth the complex provisions of the Pay
Ratio Disclosure and the obligations it places upon publicly held companies.
Part II argues that the Pay Ratio Disclosure does not accomplish its desired
effect, but instead imposes burdensome costs on registrant companies,
providing no tangible benefit to shareholders. Part III analyzes the D.C.
Circuit’s recent decisions where the Court has invalidated SEC rules for
19. See Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit invalidated SEC rules on numerous other occasions leading up to
Business Roundtable. This Note will analyze Business Roundtable and two similar court decisions
in Section III.
20. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement of Daniel M.
Gallagher Concerning the Proposal of Rules to Implement the Section 953(b) Pay Ratio Disclosure
Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 2 (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/
PublicStmt/1370542558873 [hereinafter Gallagher, Additional Dissenting Statement]; see also The
Warren Commission, supra note 11.
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failing to adequately consider the statutory and economic consequences. Part
IV asserts that the Pay Ratio Disclosure should be legally challenged and,
following the recent trend, similarly invalidated on the ground that the SEC
did not adequately engage in a cost-benefit analysis or consider reasonable
alternatives. Part V suggests that Congress repeal21 Section 953(b) of DoddFrank and direct the SEC to promulgate a new rule implementing a soft pay
cap with respect to executive compensation.22 A soft pay cap achieves a
similar result that the Pay Ratio Disclosure intended, but does so in a way
that reduces compliance costs and provides tangible benefits, such that it
would survive judicial review under a cost-benefit analysis.
Admittedly, arguing that the federal government should delve further
into the traditional corporate governance sphere is likely to be unpopular.
However, this Note asserts that, although the states have historically
regulated corporate governance, it is well within Congress’s enumerated
powers to preempt state law in favor of its own regulatory ideals. In other
words, Congress acts within its enumerated powers to announce such a rule,
especially where state laws have not adequately solved the issue of excessive
executive compensation.
I. PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE AND THE BACKDROP OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In 2008, the United States economy suffered “its most dangerous crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.”23 Indeed, between 2007 and 2009
the United States witnessed the loss of 8.8 million jobs and $19.2 trillion in
household wealth.24 By the end of 2008, major economies across the world
found themselves engulfed in recession,25 including the United States, where
the housing market, some of the largest institutional bodies, and the
automotive industry rapidly declined.26 The origins of the financial crisis are
rooted in substandard securities regulations, namely in the housing and
21. Because the directive for the SEC to enact rules comes from Congress, Section 953 would
need to be repealed and a new statute enacted with the new directive.
22. Representative Jeb Hensarling has introduced a bill in Congress that, among a vast array of
other actions, would repeal Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank, though it does not seek to replace this
section with any further directives, as this Note asserts in Part V. See Financial CHOICE Act, H.R.
5983, 114th Cong. § 449 (2015). Another bill, which has, at the time of publication of this Note,
passed in the House, will require the SEC to engage in a mandatory cost-benefit analysis prior to
rulemaking. See generally SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 79, 115th Cong. §2 (20162017).
23. Joel Haveman, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Year in Review 2008, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.britannica.com/topic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The-14842
64.
24. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSE IN CHARTS A1 (2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chartcenter/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf.
25. See Haveman, supra note 23.
26. Id.
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mortgage markets,27 in conjunction with misleading credit rating references
that triggered a number of unsound investments.28
Consequently, Dodd-Frank was signed into law on July 21, 2010, as a
“response to the 2008-2009 financial crisis.”29 Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank,
commonly known as the Pay Ratio Disclosure, required the SEC to craft rules
“necessary to implement a requirement that public company quarterly
mandatory disclosures to the agency include the ratio between the total
compensation of their chief executive officer (CEO) and all other
employees.”30 On September 18, 2013, the SEC released its first proposal of
the Pay Ratio Disclosure, which invited the public to comment.31 The
proposal was ultimately adopted as a final rule on August 5, 2015.32 After
receiving over 287,000 comment letters,33 the SEC adopted changes in
varying degrees, but noted that the final rule was generally consistent34 with
the original proposal.
The Pay Ratio Disclosure took effect on January 1, 2017,35 and requires
registrants (i.e., publicly held companies that are subject to compensation
disclosure rules) to disclose, once every three years: (1) the median of the
annual total compensation of all employees of the registrant; (2) the annual
total compensation of the CEO, or any equivalent executive position; and (3)
a ratio of the two amounts.36 In determining the “median employee,”
companies are allowed to choose their own method, based upon their own
circumstances. Registrant companies are entitled to make use of statistical
sampling in determining a median.37 Further, companies are allowed to adjust
for employee cost of living (provided the company has employees living
throughout the United States) using reasonable estimates to determine a

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
See The Warren Commission, supra note 11.
SHORTER, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75,610,
80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
33. The SEC received 1,500 individual letters, the remaining balance were received as form
letters. Aguilar, supra note 10. Importantly, it is unclear the exact number of letters in support of or
against the Pay Ratio Disclosure, however, for reasons set forth in Section IV of this Note, the
comment letters prove to be important when discussing issues regarding the adoption of the Pay
Ratio Disclosure.
34. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,110.
35. Id.; Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Reconsideration of Pay Ratio
Rule Implementation 1 (Feb. 6, 2017) (stating “that some issuers have begun to encounter
unanticipated compliance difficulties that may hinder them in meeting the reporting deadline” and
granting a forty-five day comment period for issuers. Based on the comments received,
Commissioner Piwowar further directed the staff to reconsider the implementation of Pay Ratio
Disclosure entirely, which comports with the suggestion of this Note).
36. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.
37. Id.
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statistical numerical.38 The Rule requires descriptions of the registrant
company’s CEO and employee median compensation in “registration
statements, proxy and information statements, and annual reports that must
already include executive compensation information as set forth under Item
402 of Regulation S-K.”39
Additionally, the Rule requires companies, in a brief description, to
disclose the methodology employed in calculating the “median employee”
income.40 Lastly, certain employees are exempt from the median employee
calculation.41 Registrant companies may invoke a de minimis exception
consisting of up to 5% of non-U.S. employees, and individuals employed by
unaffiliated third parties or independent contractors are not considered
company employees.42 The stated purpose of the Pay Ratio Disclosure, as
announced by the SEC, is to “provide shareholders with a company-specific
metric that can assist in their evaluation of a registrant’s executive
compensation practice.”43 As discussed in the following section, issues arise
because of an evident disparity between the theoretical and practical effects
of placing these obligations upon registrant companies.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE
As noted above, the Pay Ratio Disclosure is intended to promote a better
understanding of the pay schemes at a specific registrant company over the
course of a three-year cycle.44 Section 951 of Dodd-Frank45 requires an
independent compensation board to propose a compensation package
through proxy materials to shareholders, who then vote on proposed
compensation (say-on-pay votes).46 The mandates of the Pay Ratio
Disclosure, when taken together with Section 951 give the appearance of
strengthened shareholder authority, though in practice this is misleading.
Importantly, while Section 951 requires a say-on-pay vote on the CEO’s
compensation, it is merely advisory and non-binding on the board.47 Indeed,
as critics of the Pay Ratio Disclosure have commented, since the say-on-payvotes are not binding on the board, it is speculative at best to find a link
between the Pay Ratio Disclosure and potential changes in CEO
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75,610,
80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
44. See id. at 14 (noting that companies are only required to file the CEO compensation, median
employee compensation, and ratio of the two every three years).
45. Dodd-Frank, Pub L. No. 111-203, §951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
46. Id. § 952.
47. Id. § 951; see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Democracy From Say on Pay to Say
on Politics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 440 (2015).
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compensation.48 Commentators in support of say-on pay and the Pay Ratio
Disclosure often cite studies showing shareholder approval in nearly ninetynine percent of say-on-pay votes since the implementation of say-on-pay
rules.49 Although there have been isolated occurrences of shareholders voting
down a compensation package, it has generally occurred from a vote by a
major institutional body.50
Another difficultly in recognizing the “complementary” effect that the
Pay Ratio Disclosure provides to existing corporate disclosure regulations
arises when one views the shortcomings of say-on-pay. This is best done by
way of example. Under Delaware law,51 shareholders generally have the right
to vote on the election of directors to the board at the annual stockholder
meeting.52 Similar to the say-on-pay voting, issues arise regarding
shareholder votes in two ways: (1) directors often nominate themselves for
re-election to the board, and as a result the slate from which shareholders are
entitled to vote is determined by the directors;53 and (2) even on the occasion
that a director is not voted to the board, resulting in a vacancy, in theory the
directors could then appoint that very same director, with protection under
the business judgment rule, or another director that is even better aligned with
the ideologies of the existing directors.54
Essentially, while stockholders may think their votes have an effect on
executive compensation packages (and admittedly, in certain circumstances,
they may),55 directors are under no obligation to abide by the say-on-pay
votes and, furthermore, directors are protected by a very high legal
standard—gross negligence—under the business judgment rule56 when they
choose not to follow the recommendations or shareholder votes. Thus, the
Pay Ratio Disclosure only furthers the illusion that providing company data
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Piwowar, supra note 11.
Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 47.
See id.
See id. at 434 (noting Delaware’s “prominent role in American Corporate Law . . . [n]early
half of all public corporations in the United States are incorporated in Delaware”).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 141, 211, 212 (2015).
53. Piwowar, supra note 11.
54. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (noting under the business
judgment rule, gross negligence is the requisite standard for a shareholder to succeed on behalf of
the corporation in a derivative suit).
55. For example, a company that is especially conscious of how the public perceives its business
conduct may elect to listen more closely to the shareholder vote, although the company is under no
obligation to do so. However, companies that are publicly traded, but generally lack the same
exposure to the public and media, may be less inclined to follow the recommendations of the
shareholders, especially where the directors are shielded under the business judgment rule. See
generally Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders’ Votes Have Done Little to Curb Lavish Executive
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/business/shareholdersvotes-have-done-little-to-curb-lavish-executive-pay.html?_r=1 (describing how shareholder
dissents of forty percent or greater at major publicly held companies have been ineffective in altering
executive compensation packages).
56. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90.
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points to shareholders is effective, as directors may not even address these
non-binding votes.
The two issues of advisory voting by shareholders and the high legal
standard to overcome the business judgment rule highlight the
ineffectiveness of the Pay Ratio Disclosure, when viewed in conjunction with
say-on-pay votes. On one hand, it may be argued that, because shareholder
approval has been consistently high for CEO compensation, the shareholders
actually do approve of the compensation. On the other hand, the more
realistic answer is less optimistic. Since shareholders have an immense
burden of proof in a derivative action,57 simply getting past the pleading stage
is a formidable and costly challenge. It requires a shareholder to mount
enough support among other shareholders to fight what may be a losing
battle, and in any case, to incur costly procedural expenditures. Thus, it seems
more likely that shareholders approve CEO compensation because they lack
a better alternative and there may be bigger battles to fight. Furthermore, the
same cost prohibitive and advisory voting issues would arise should the
shareholder elect not to bring a derivative action, but rather to attempt to
create a second compensation committee to rebut the veracity of the
company’s independent compensation committee’s compensation package.
Again, the shareholders will have engaged in a costly endeavor to create
another independent committee, the findings of which will be advisory and
non-binding.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the independent committee is itself an
effective mechanism to combat executive compensation.58 On one hand, a
legitimate argument may be made that compensation committees, acting in
the best interest of the company, pay high compensation due to competition,
which remains important for “executive recruitment and retention.”59 If
companies must compensate CEOs with large compensation packages in
order to recruit CEOs due to a competitive market, then it seems that the
committees are justified in paying such high amounts.60
However, the argument against exuberant executive compensation is that
the compensation system is broken; this highlights different issues. First and
foremost, there is for the reasons addressed above, a prisoner’s dilemma 61 in
57. In re Citigroup, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting
that it is difficult to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule by a showing of gross
negligence).
58. Section V of this Note deals with a solution that will overcome, or at least mitigate, many of
these issues.
59. See generally SHORTER, supra note 13.
60. For example, in 2014, Timothy D. Cook of Apple was paid $9.2 million, Jamie Dimon of
JPMorgan Chase made $20 million, Howard Schultz of Starbucks made $21.5 million, and Phillipe
Dauman received $44.3 million. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, S.E.C. Has Yet to Set Rules on Tricky
Pay Ratio of C.E.O.’s Pay to Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:17 PM), https://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2015/01/26/tricky-ratio-of-chief-executives-pay-to-workers/.
61. “The prisoners’ dilemma is the best-known game of strategy in social science. It helps us
understand what governs the balance between cooperation and competition in business, in politics,
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that, even if compensation committees resigned themselves to restricting
executive compensation, another compensation committee may not do so,
even if it was collectively in the best interest of corporate governance.
Because it is possible for a single holdout compensation committee to retain
for itself the best possible CEO in its respective industry by offering him or
her more money, the collective fear of losing out prevents internal corporate
cooperation. This dilemma makes it detrimental for one compensation
committee to attempt to better align its corporate compensation with the
wishes of shareholders or special interest groups that believe the CEO is
being overcompensated.
Further, pursuant to Section 952 of Dodd-Frank,62 compensation
committees must be independent,63 that is, “each member of the
compensation committee of the board of directors of an issuer [must] be a
member of the board of directors of the issuer; and independent.”64 In other
words, the compensation committee naturally incorporates the board of
directors, who are tasked with seeking independent consultants, to reach a
fair compensation package.65 The consultants that are brought in must be
independent of the registrant company; they may not be affiliated with the
registrant company, any of the registrant company’s subsidiaries, or with any
of the directors on the board.66
However, this requirement is misleading. The compensation committee
and its consultants still need to be compensated by the company for their
work. Moreover, it would stand to reason that if the consultants cut against
the ideology of the board members who hire them, or act in ways that
dissatisfy the board, then those consultants might be replaced in favor of
other consultants who share similar ideologies as the CEO and board.
Although this arguably guts the purpose of the compensation committee, it
does not violate the Rule.67 For example, if a shareholder were to dispute the
selection of certain members to the compensation committee, the most
logical response from the company would be that the members of the
compensation committee are independent; the mere fact that the committee
and its consultants share the same ideals as the entire board does not amount
to gross negligence, nor should it. Thus, the compensation committee, for
competitive, and perhaps more cynical, reasons, aligns itself with the board,
more so than the shareholders, with the end result primarily being that an
and in social settings.” Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff, The Prisoners’ Dilemma, LIBR. OF ECON.
& LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2017).
62. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 (July 27, 2002).
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independent compensation committee will not aid in restricting executive
compensation.
Lastly, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the compensation committee is under no
obligation to adhere to the recommendations proffered by the consultants.68
The odd result of this provision is that on the one hand, the board of directors
does not trigger a violation by employing consultants that comport with their
ideology. On the other hand, the board may shield itself from criticism by
utilizing individuals that offer a more conservative compensation approach,
which the compensation committee can disregard while still maintaining that
consultants were sought for advice.
The costs of complying with the Pay Ratio Disclosure present one of the
most highly contested issues surrounding the Rule. The estimated amount of
compliance cost is $1.3 billion dollars in initial compliance for all registrant
companies,69 and ongoing costs of $526 million dollars.70 The SEC estimated
the cost of compliance at $1.3 billion in its public release of the finalized pay
disclosure, asserting that per registrant the cost of compliance, especially in
larger companies, may reach $368,159.71 If the Pay Ratio Disclosure
produced tangible benefits, perhaps this cost would be understandable, and
quite possibly acceptable. However, the minimal tangible effect, in
conjunction with the compliance costs, makes the Pay Ratio Disclosure
untenable. Given that say-on-pay72 provides less than desirable, and in fact
illusory authority to shareholders, a rule like the Pay Ratio Disclosure, which
provides company-specific metrics to shareholders to aid in an advisory vote,
results in a glaring disconnect between burden and benefit to both the
company and its shareholders. Thus, if say-on-pay produces inadequate
results to restrict executive compensation, by logical extension the
complementary Pay Ratio Disclosure is equally inadequate.
The Pay Ratio Disclosure, independent of its complimentary reliance
upon say-on pay, is insufficient in achieving its own stated goals. The stated
purpose of the Rule, as noted, was “to provide shareholders with a companyspecific metric that can assist in their evaluation of a registrant’s executive
68. Dodd-Frank, § 952.
69. Piwowar, supra note 11; see also Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877,

Exchange Act Release No. 75,610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 240, 249). The SEC in its announcement of the finalized Pay Ratio Disclosure discusses various
estimated costs of compliance. It does not come to a definite number, but generally agrees with the
$1.3 billion estimate, equating to $368,159 per registrant. See IKE BRANNON, CTR. FOR CAPITAL
MKTS., THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF THE SEC’S PAY-RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION (2014),
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-PayRatio.pdf.
70. Gallagher, supra note 11.
71. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,105.
72. Say-on-pay is the result of Section 951 of Dodd-Frank, requiring that a shareholder vote be
given on executive compensation packages, that shareholders vote on the frequency of the
compensation vote, and that shareholders authorize “golden parachute” provisions. Dodd-Frank, §
951.
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compensation practice.”73 Indeed, a company-specific metric provides data
to shareholders that is incomparable to any other publicly held company.74
Thus, although shareholders may have the impression that their CEO is being
overpaid, the pay ratio data fails to provide data points that helpfully ascertain
appropriate compensation.
Moreover, based on how a company calculates the median income,
scenarios arise where shareholders receive distorted depictions of the true
ratio.75 The SEC’s inclusion of a de minimis exception, which excludes five
percent of non-U.S. employees in the calculus of the median employee
income, “[introduces] a non-scientific and uninstructed comparison that
ignores the variances in the costs of labor, and the costs of living in widely
disparate economies worldwide.”76 Additionally, former SEC Commissioner
Daniel M. Gallagher asserted in his dissent to both the proposed and final Pay
Ratio Disclosure that the SEC might be better served in constructing a rule
that is narrowed to only U.S. employees.77 Commissioner Gallagher reasoned
that the proper course of action would have been to supplant the de minimis
exception with a wholesale exception to employees outside the United
States.78 On one hand, Commissioner Gallagher asserts that this would result
in savings of approximately $788 million in compliance costs;79 however,
there is a necessary trade-off.
Despite the fact that, in Commissioner Gallagher’s opinion, “[the SEC]
already provide[s] a wealth of good comparable data to investors about
executive pay,”80 removing non-U.S. employees from the calculus would
have detrimental consequences. For example, if non-U.S. employees do not
count towards the ratio, there would be little to stop the CEO or corporate
boards from allocating all of their domestic employees abroad.81 Effectively,
in one fell swoop, the ratio would be destroyed. Or worse, a company could
re-allocate all of its employees, excluding the top ten percent of highest paid
employees, so as to reflect a much closer, albeit deceptive, ratio. The end
result presents less than desirable outcomes from both perspectives and
underscores the ineffectiveness of the Pay Ratio Disclosure. Either
73. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,105.
74. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that pay ratio data is “low quality, non-comparable

data of use only to certain investors who has idiosyncratic reasons for wanting it”).
75. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Additional Dissenting Statement at
Open
Meeting
on
Pay
Ratio
Disclosure
3–7
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/additional-dissenting-statement-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html
[hereinafter Piwowar, Additional Dissenting Statement]; see also Gallagher, supra note 11.
76. Gallagher, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 20.
77. Gallagher, supra note 11; Gallagher, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 20
78. Gallagher, supra note 11; Gallagher, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 20.
79. Gallagher, supra note 11.
80. Id.
81. Ike Brannon & Sam Batkins, The Meaninglessness of the SEC Pay Disclosure Rule,
REGULATION, Spring 2014, at 9, 10, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regula
tion/2014/4/v37n1-11_1.pdf#page=6.
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companies must pay an additional $788 million in compliance costs to
incorporate what is at best an arbitrary de minimis exclusion,82 which
ultimately can be manipulated,83 or pay substantially less money and receive
numbers that still have the potential of being massively manipulated.84 As
this Note suggests, rather than attempt to amend the Pay Ratio Disclosure in
piecemeal fashion, resolving the issue of excessive executive compensation
would be best achieved by supplanting the Pay Ratio Disclosure with a soft
pay cap.
The SEC and Congress have been further criticized for implementing the
Pay Ratio Disclosure as a deceptive political mechanism designed to appease
progressives.85 Pay Ratio Disclosure provides a shield to the SEC behind
which the federal government has been able to indirectly involve itself in
regulating the inner sanctum of corporate governance. The Pay Ratio
Disclosure appears on its face to be purely a disclosure rule. However, the
effect of say-on pay, in conjunction with Section 952 and the Pay Ratio
Disclosure, reflects an outcome where shareholders are given illusory
authority, easily overcome by the registrant company. However, pursuant to
the Pay Ratio Disclosure, the information must still be filed with the SEC.86
Thus, because the financial data is brought to public light, Congress and the
SEC intended to “name and blame” corporations into self-adjusting pay to
conform to a more agreeable social standard, rather than to actually supply
useful information intended to inform shareholders.87
On one hand, Congress and the SEC, through this strategy, seek to
remedy what has often been a popular notion that corporate executives are
overcompensated, and the facts concerning the large pay disparity between
corporate executives and the employees who work for them.88 However, this
also seems like a furtive approach for two reasons: (1) it has the effect of
shifting the burden of pressuring these perceived powerhouse boards into
lowering the CEO compensation onto people who lack the real authority to
enforce such a change; and (2) it becomes somewhat of an irony that the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Piwowar, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 75.
Id.
See infra Part V.
See The Warren Commission, supra note 11.
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75,610,
80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249); see also
Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Corp. Governance Comm., Bus. Roundtable to The
Honorable Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-565.pdf (requesting an amendment to the Pay Ratio Disclosure, in
that the material be considered “furnished” rather than filed”).
87. Piwowar, supra note 11; see also, Brannon & Batkins, supra note 81; Gallagher, supra note
11; see also Peter Schoeder, Disputed Rule Intended to Shame CEOs, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2012, 10:30
AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/208161-disputed-rule-intended-to-shame-ceos.
88. See Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 112–13 (2010).
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regulator demands transparency from the corporations and attempts to
accomplish that end by becoming opaque itself in providing an underhanded
political mechanism, rather than announcing and instituting legislation that
reveals its true intent.89 As Commissioner Gallagher stated in his dissenting
statement, with respect to the SEC:
The goal is to convince the public that the Commission is doing all it can
reasonably do to help issuers reduce costs – that is that the Commission is
pushing at the sides of the box, while staying in its confines. But the
Commission here is a mime; the box is imaginary. 90

Thus Congress decided that, rather than take an affirmative step in
regulating corporate compensation91—biting the bullet on an issue that would
undoubtedly be highly partisan and open it to criticism—it would couch its
underlying intention in behind rules centered on disclosure, with the hope
that public backlash would solve the issue. In fact, this has resulted in a rule
that likely will likely be invalidated under the cost-benefit analysis utilized
by the D.C. Circuit,92 and further does not actually remedy the issues
surrounding executive compensation. Lastly, one might plausibly infer from
the Pay Ratio Disclosure the social aim of restricting executive compensation
as a means of achieving greater compensation parity with the common,
everyday employee of the respective company. However, based upon the
SEC’s own stated goals, parity in compensation as between the executive and
employee was never the intended result. Yet for the reasons stated above, a
policy-based message serves the purpose with respect to Congress’s attempt
to reduce costs at the executive level in an attempt to prevent another
financial crisis.
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC93 marked “the
third time within the past six years that the D.C. Circuit struck down an SEC
rulemaking for failure to adequately consider the statutory and economic
impacts of proposed regulation.”94 Where the requirement for the SEC to
adequately consider the statutory and economic impacts of proposed

89. See Gallagher, supra note 11.
90. Id.
91. This Note argues in Section V that such an action is well within Congress’s enumerated

powers to do so, and furthermore, has successfully done so in other securities regulation areas.
92. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Am.
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bus. Roundtable & Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
93. Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce, 647 F.3d at 1144.
94. Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, A Tale of Two Commissions: A Compendium of the
Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565,
595 (2012).
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regulation comes from is a source of debate in and of itself.95 Some
commentators assert that the obligation stems from the judicial power granted
in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to invalidate rules
where there is a finding that the rulemaking was “arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”96 SEC
Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar further stated that, “[w]hen engaging in
informal rulemaking, the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . must
satisfy three procedural requirements under the Administrative Procedure
Act . . . general notice of the proposed rulemaking, an opportunity for
interested persons to participate in the rulemaking, and a concise statement
of the basis and purpose of the rules adopted after consideration of the
relevant matter presented.”97
The D.C. Circuit began this trend in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,98
where the SEC was challenged on a finalized rule provision requiring that, in
order to engage in actions otherwise prohibited by the Investment Company
Act,99 mutual funds had to have a board with no less than seventy-five percent
independent directors and an independent chairman (the Mutual Fund
Rule).100 The D.C. Circuit held that “the Commission did violate the APA by
failing adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to
comply with the conditions, and by failing adequately to consider a proposed
alternative to the independent chairman condition.”101 In the Court’s view,
the most problematic aspect of the Mutual Fund Rule was that the SEC
claimed that it was “without a reliable basis for determining how funds would
choose to satisfy the [condition] and therefore it [was] difficult to determine
the costs associated with electing independent directors.”102 Thus, the Court
reasoned, “uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does
not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to
apprise itself–and hence the public and the Congress–of the economic
consequences of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the
measure.”103 The general rule that flowed from this decision is that an SEC
rulemaking cannot survive judicial scrutiny, nor can the SEC excuse itself
from engaging in a real cost-benefit analysis, by simply stating it had “no
reliable basis” for assessing the cost of its rules.104
95. Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 57
ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 133– 49 (2015).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
97. Piwowar, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 75, at 1.
98. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
99. See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 56 Stat. 798 (2012)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2012)).
100. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 136.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 143.
103. Id. at 144.
104. See Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at 581.

556

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 11

The D.C. Circuit next invalidated an SEC rule in American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC.105 In this case, a challenge was brought
against SEC Rule 151A, which declared that a contract regulated as an
annuity under state insurance law does not qualify as an “annuity contract”
under the Securities Act,106 effectively excluding fixed indexed annuities
from being annuity contracts.107 Here, the SEC argued that it was not required
under the Securities Act to engage in a cost-benefit analysis.108 The D.C.
Circuit, however, thought differently and stated that the SEC’s argument was
flawed, because when the SEC issued the rule it conducted an analysis, and
never stated it was not required to.109 The Court then opined that the SEC
must defend its analysis “on that basis it employed in adopting the
analysis.”110
Furthermore, the Court stated, “[t]he lack of clarity resulting from the
‘uncertain legal status’ of the financial product is only another way of saying
that there was not a regulation in place prior to the adaptation of Rule 151A
. . . [t]he SEC cannot justify the adoption of a particular rule based solely on
the assertion that the existence of a rule provides greater clarity to an area
that remained unclear.”111 Taken in conjunction with the Chamber of
Commerce holding, the D.C. Circuit definitively held that the SEC cannot
engage in arbitrary rulemaking and that the SEC must engage in a meaningful
cost-benefit analysis to gauge whether a rule is in fact arbitrary. Thus, the
SEC, in defending a legal challenge, cannot skirt these requirements by
simply not engaging in a cost-benefit analysis and later arguing that they were
under no obligation to do so.
In Business Round Table v. SEC,112 the D.C. Circuit invalidated SEC
Rule 14a, the “Proxy Access Rule,”113 stating that the SEC did not appreciate
the intensity with which issuers would oppose shareholder nominees.114
According to the Court, the SEC had “no basis beyond mere speculation”
when it concluded the rule would be cost effective,115 had relied on
insufficient empirical data,116 had improperly discounted costs, did not
105. See generally Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
106. See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (2012) (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)).
107. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 171–72; see Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at
582.
108. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 171–72; see Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at
582.
109. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
110. Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at 583.
111. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177.
112. See generally Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
113. Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at 595–96.
114. Id. at 596.
115. Id. at 596–97.
116. Id.
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properly gauge the effect on shareholders with special interests,117 and was
inconsistent in estimating the character of shareholder nominations.118 Thus,
the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Proxy Access Rule as arbitrary and
capricious, and held that the SEC failed to engage in a proper cost-benefit
analysis and failed to adequately consider the statutory and economic
consequences of the proposed regulation.119
Lastly, in what may be considered a quasi-victory for the SEC, the D.C.
Circuit, in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC,120 held that the
SEC rule in question survived the cost-benefit judicial scrutiny.121 Section
1502 of Dodd-Frank122 directed the SEC to “issue regulations requiring firms
using ‘conflict minerals’ to investigate and disclose the origins of those
minerals.”123 The goal of the SEC “Conflict Minerals Rule”124 at issue was to
devise a congressional response to the Congo War,125 where armed forces
used the sale of minerals to finance their combat operations.126
The finalized Conflict Minerals Rule required a three-step analysis.127
Step one required a firm to determine whether or not the rule pertained to that
firm.128 For example, the rule would not apply to those firms that did not
require the minerals as “necessary to the production or functionality of their
products.”129 The final rule also did not include a de minimis exception; thus
firms that dealt with conflict materials, even in small amounts, were subject
to the rule.130 Step two required an issuer to “conduct a ‘reasonable country
of origin inquiry,’”131 and step three required an issuer to “exercise due
diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict materials.”132 If
after performing due diligence (step two) an issuer still had reason to believe
its conflict minerals originated in a country covered by the Conflicts Mineral
Rule, it would then be required to file a Conflict Minerals Report, which
would “describe both [the issuers] due diligence efforts, including a private
117. Id. at 598.
118. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see Bishop &

Coffee, supra note 94, at 598.
119. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 171; see Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at 597–
98.
120. See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
121. Id.
122. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 2213 (2010) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012)).
123. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 363 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)).
124. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,284–85 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 CFR
pts. 240, 249, 249(b)).
125. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 363.
126. Id. at 362–63.
127. Id. at 363.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 363–64 (quoting Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,311 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(codified at 17 CFR pts. 240, 249, 249(b))).
132. Id. at 364 (quoting Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,320).
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sector audit and those products that have ‘not been found to be DRC conflict
free.’”133
A challenge was brought against the Conflict Mineral Rule, with the D.C.
Circuit holding that “[t]he Commission did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously by choosing not to include a de minimis exception,”134 because
the factual context provided to the Court highlighted that conflict minerals
were ordinarily used in very small quantities.135 Further, the Court held the
due diligence requirement was not arbitrary and capricious,136 because “the
Commission wanted issuers who encounter red flags to ‘learn[] the ultimate
source of their conflict materials.’”137 Thus, “a good faith inquiry does not
resolve the Commission’s concerns.”138 The Court further held that “[t]he
Commission did not erroneously assume that its interpretation was compelled
by Congress,”139 and agreed with the SEC that the rule was “rational,”
because, insofar as the SEC is concerned, it seldom had been required to deal
with such a task and could only be effectively responsible to know what it
knows.140 In other words, the SEC, from a cost-benefit perspective, did not
have adequate data to quantify the costs associate with the rule.141 Thus, the
Court supported the Commission on its cost-side analysis,142 holding that,
with respect to the costs of compliance, “[t]he Commission exhaustively
analyzed the final rule’s costs.”143
Although the SEC was able to overcome the cost-benefit analysis
requirement in National Association of Manufacturers,144 the Pay Ratio
Disclosure presents distinctly different issues than did the Conflict Minerals
Rule. The issue of executive compensation is surely rooted in the realm of
socially desirable goals; however, the CEO executive compensation in a
publically traded company, no matter how egregious that compensation is,
pales in comparison to the issues the Conflict Minerals Rule sought to
resolve. The Conflict Minerals Rule, if validated, had the potential, and
indeed intention, to save the lives of human beings in the Congo, whereas the
Pay Ratio Disclosure seeks only to provide for a more informed stockholder
vote. Additionally, there is a distinct disparity between the required
information in the Conflict Minerals Reports and the information the SEC
133. Id. (citing Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,322, 56,320; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii)
(2012)).
134. Id. at 366.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 367.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 368.
140. Id. at 368–69 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
141. Id. at 369.
142. Id. at 369.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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requires in its Pay Ratio Disclosures.145 Finally, unlike the conflict minerals
issue, rulemaking surrounding executive compensation as it relates to
registrant companies is an area in which the SEC certainly can be said to have
expertise in regulating and, thus, a more stringent cost-benefit analysis should
be required.
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE PAY RATIO
DISCLOSURE
Given the recent trend in the D.C. Circuit, should the Pay Ratio
Disclosure be challenged it likely would not survive judicial scrutiny. In the
SEC’s release of the finalized Pay Ratio Disclosure, the SEC stated,
“Congress did not expressly state the specific objectives or intended benefits
of Section 953(b), and the legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act also does
not expressly state the Congressional purpose underlying Section 953(b).”146
The SEC, in announcing the proposed Pay Ratio Disclosure, “failed to
identify any objective goal, or benefit that the Commission believed the
rulemaking was intended to accomplish.”147 Further, Commissioner Piwowar
notes that, “[r]ather than stating [the Commission’s] thinking on Section
953(b)’s objectives, the Proposing Release merely obliquely indicated that
[the Commission’s] proposal was intended to achieve ‘what [they] believe to
be the potential benefits . . . .’”148
Additionally, criticisms have been levied, with SEC Commissioners
Piwowar and Gallagher leading the charge,149 specifically arguing that once
the SEC decided what objective Section 953 was intended to accomplish, it
failed to publicly disclose the information prior to adoption of the Rule.150
Moreover, “[t]he Commission failed to consider what the quantitative effects
of providing flexibility would be on the accuracy of the pay ratio,”151 and
acted “arbitrarily and capriciously when it defined ‘employee’ to exclude
contract workers only if they are employed by an unaffiliated third party.” 152
In other words, while the costs of the Rule, as noted above, were clearly
explicated, the SEC has failed to identify the requisite benefit to coincide
with its costs.
As Commissioner Piwowar points out, should a corporation retain, for
example, a solo practitioner, the compensation that attorney receives would
come directly from the company, thus classifying the attorney as an
employee, when in fact, the attorney is not. Further, by extrapolation, this
145. See supra Part II.
146. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75,610,

80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,105 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
147. Piwowar, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 75, at 1.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
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applies to others who do not get paid by third parties, but are not traditionally
thought of as employees of the company.153 In the aggregate, this type of
classification has the potential to again skew the data, leading to what
Commissioner Gallagher referred to as “eye-poppingly huge ratios.”154
Lastly, the SEC has faced withering criticism for its decision to
implement the Pay Ratio Disclosure, when many, such as Commissioner
Gallagher, have argued:
[w]e must, therefore, acknowledge as another cost of the rule the decision
not to do something else, something more pressing, something that would
have yielded discernible benefits – a JOBS Act rulemaking to address the
ongoing employment crisis in this country, perhaps, or something –
anything – to do with the financial crisis – maybe, for example, the DoddFrank section 939A rulemaking that is years overdue.155

While it cannot be expected that the SEC exhaust every possible scenario
with respect to rulemaking benefits, it is unfortunately clear that the SEC
promulgated a rule in which the benefits at best could be considered minimal
and further had a high coinciding cost.
The SEC created the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Information in September of 2009,156 as a means to implement cost-benefit
analyses so as to comply with the judicial requirements.157 Unfortunately, as
it regards the Pay Ratio Disclosure, the SEC got the financial analysis correct
in being able to fully disclose the cost associated with the rule, but failed to
engage in any real meaningful cost-benefit analysis anywhere else.
Furthermore, while a high cost may be tolerable, if that cost was heavily
analyzed and there seemed to be some benefit implicit in the end, the Pay
Ratio Disclosure would probably survive. However, the Rule presents a
different scenario, one in which there is a high cost and little tangible benefit.
The conclusion thus indicates that the Pay Ratio Disclosure should and will
be invalidated.
V. MOVING FORWARD: AMENDING 953(B) AND
IMPLEMENTING A SOFT PAY CAP
Given this Note’s argument that the Pay Ratio Disclosure is an
inadequate mechanism to confront the issues of executive compensation,
153. Id. at 5.
154. Gallagher, Additional Dissenting Statement, supra note 20 (noting that this list could include

freelance journalists, photographers, artists commissioned to produce artwork, doctors and
physicians at publicly held hospitals, and cyber security consultants).
155. Id.
156. Bishop & Coffee, supra note 94, at 599.
157. An additional, but previously unmentioned, facet of the CHOICE Act is the statutory
override of Chevron Deference in favor of a statutorily mandated cost benefit analysis on agency
rulemaking. See Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 612 (2015).
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coupled with highly partisan resistance to federal regulation of corporate
governance, the next logical step in addressing the issue is providing a
workable solution for both ends of the argument. This Note suggests that
Congress affirmatively immerse itself in executive pay.
There have been arguments contrary to this position, which assert that
the federal government should stay out of corporate governance, because
state laws are better equipped to handle the intricacies and respond more
efficiently to the changing scenarios presented in corporate governance.158
However, state law has refrained from doing so, mainly by allowing
corporate boards to determine pay, with the afforded protection of the
business judgment rule.159 Thus, even if state law is better equipped to
respond to issues such as compensation, where the state law has not
responded at all, federal regulation may be necessary.
Further, even if it is assumed for the purposes of argument that state law
is better equipped to handle corporate governance issues, the suggestion of a
federal regulation is not harmful. Federal legislation could serve as the
starting point from which state law could then align itself. Under this theory,
as the federal regulation becomes more and more outdated, the state laws
could improve upon the foundation provided by federal regulations, thus still
accomplishing the goal of dealing with executive compensation issues.
A secondary challenge to federal intervention in corporate governance is
that it may violate principles of federalism, an argument that was raised
against the say-on-pay provisions.160 However, “[a]ny concern about
congressional authority to regulate corporations has long been put to rest.
Under the increasingly liberal interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress’ power is understood to be very broad, and clearly corporations
(even very small ones) affect interstate commerce . . . “161 Thus, Congress is
acting on “firm Commerce Clause ground.”162 Therefore, this Note
recommends that Congress repeal Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank and direct
the SEC to promulgate a meaningful compensation rule in the form of a soft
pay cap.
Under a soft cap the SEC would mandate annually that CEOs receive
compensation in an amount not to exceed “X” percent of the companies’ net
income. This would accomplish the end that Congress ultimately seeks under
the Pay Ratio Disclosure, but devoid of the extensive costs, in that the
information required to furnish to the SEC would in theory be information
the company already maintains. Under this theory, a company would be
158. See generally Fisch, supra note 17.
159. Id. at 746.
160. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 47, at 446 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481

U.S. 69, 89 (1987)) (“No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than
a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting
rights of shareholders.”).
161. Fisch, supra note 17, at 737.
162. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 47, at 448–50.
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required to disclose its average net profit for the previous three years, which
is information all companies should have readily available. Next, the
compensation committee, under Section 952163 (subject to enforcement by
the SEC Division of Enforcement) would, engaging the use of consultants
and the board, use predictive analytics to project a range of net income for
the coming annual year, derived from reports by analysts within the company
and research reports from third party analysts. From the estimate, the CEO
would be entitled to the “X” percent that the SEC announces for that year.
Logistically, the compensation committee would formulate a range of
predicted company net profit from which it would then apply a percentage as
directed by the SEC, which percentage represents the maximum
compensation permissible for the CEO, for that year.
Importantly, this would not dis-incentivize CEOs from performance—it
would do the opposite. As the company’s net income grows, so too would
the pay the CEO receives. Thus, this theory does not fall prey to
counterarguments levied against strict pay caps that are thought to be overly
intrusive.164 Here, the CEO would be incentivized to ensure the company
succeeds, as the CEO compensation would be directly tied to that success.
Additionally, under this theory the CEO would be more closely aligned with
the stockholders, whose investment value would rise in lockstep with the
compensation afforded to the executive. There are, of course, factors to
consider, particularly in the market, which may present a scenario where the
particular company endures a difficult financial period. However, under a
soft pay cap scheme, the CEO would still be entitled to the last numerical
compensation afforded to him or her as of the last valuation.
Thus, analysts taking part in the modeling of the companies’ net profit in
the current period and forecasting for the future would be able to assess those
factors, namely, whether or not the downturn is a market event, not solely
attributable to the company, and more importantly, whether or not the
downturn is expected to be short or long term. In the event the downturn is
short term, it would be reasonable to leave the compensation as is.
Alternatively, if the downturn is thought to be long term, the compensation
committee can adjust the compensation to reflect the lesser value of the
company. One import of the soft pay cap is directly aligned with deterring
company-specific actions that would effectuate such a downturn. In other
words, it is in the best financial interest of the executive to take actions that
are for the betterment of the company, while still allowing flexibility for the
incurrence of a certain level of risk.
Another issue that might arise from a strict pay cap, though one that does
not arise under this theory, is that often pay caps reflect only one of many
163. Dodd-Frank, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
164. Caywood, supra note 88, at 127.
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forms of compensation, namely salary.165 They do not take into account
alternative forms of compensation, such as stock options.166 However, under
this theory, accounting for an executive’s entire compensation is possible,
without the potential issue of the government being “overly intrusive and
punitive.”167
For example, if the maximum percentage allowable was twenty percent
and the predicted net income of the company was $1 million, the CEO for
that year would be entitled to no more than $200,000. Further, if the
compensation committee awarded the CEO $200,000 in salary, then there is
no issue—except that the CEO would not be entitled for that year to receive
stock options in lieu of payment.168 However, if the committee and the board
were to issue 50,000 shares of stock priced at $1 per share, set to vest at a
given time during the year, the committee would pay the CEO no more than
$150,000 dollars in salary, plus other compensatory payments, such as
bonuses, insurance, etc. If in Year 2 the stock price rose to $2, effectively
making them worth $100,000, it does not follow that the CEO’s pay would
decrease. In fact, it would increase along with the increase in the stock price,
as the increase in price signals an increase in net profit. Therefore, the CEO’s
compensation would increase, but at a rate that is tenable and understandable
to the stockholders. However, taken to the other end, where a company is
accused of materially misleading its shareholders by announcing
unsupported and excessive predictions to pad the pocket of the CEO, such
companies would certainly be subject to SEC Division of Enforcement
investigation.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The obvious fear associated with a “hard” or “strict” pay cap is that the regulatory body,

here the SEC, establishes a limit on pay that executives cannot exceed. Thus, in effect the regulatory
body controls the salary of individuals and “decouples pay from performance.” A soft pay cap
however, does not require a strict adherence to a numerical salary, but rather encompasses all forms
of compensation to provide a closer alignment between the long-term health of the company and
executive, while maintaining a backstop to short term superfluous compensation. Additionally, there
remains a concern that the regulatory body in strictly regulating compensation, will result in
executives seeking to relocate outside of the United States, where they may be entitled to higher
compensation, resulting in harm to United States companies. However, again, under a soft cap,
while compensation may be minimally restricted in the present, the future presents endless
opportunity to increase compensation tied to the increasing health of the company. Id.
168. However, it would theoretically be possible for the CEO to receive stock options that would
vest at a future date, provided those stock options and their estimated value are accounted for in the
following year’s salary for that CEO. An example of this would be to say, in year one, the CEO is
entitled to no more than $200,000, but received $200,000 in salary, and 1,000 stock options. The
stock options would be impermissible if the vesting date occurred in the same annual period that
the $200,000 vested. However, if the stock vests at a later period, the CEO would be entitled to
them, if the value of the vesting stock is deducted from the CEO’s allowable salary. Thus, if the
stocks were to vest in the middle of year two, and were valued at $5 each, and the CEO for that year
was entitled to $250,000, the maximum allowable compensation would be $250,000, less the
vesting date price of the previous year’s stock option, or $245,000.
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CONCLUSION
The SEC undoubtedly formulated the Pay Ratio Disclosure in good faith,
in an attempt to corral the ever-increasing compensation packages afforded
to CEOs of publicly held companies. However, the SEC left much to be
desired in affirmatively contesting the issue of executive compensation. The
failure of Pay Ratio Disclosure to provide the authority for a shareholder to
effect changes in compensation practices as a company makes the Pay Ratio
Disclosure problematic, but workable. Providing shareholders with noncomparable company metrics with respect to the compensation of the median
employee comparative to the CEO, coupled with insufficiencies in how to
properly determine a “median employee,” make the Pay Ratio Disclosure
untenable, especially when the high compliance costs to each company are
considered. Further, in the likely occurrence that the Pay Ratio Disclosure is
challenged legally, it will fail to survive the necessary judicial scrutiny of a
cost-benefit analysis.
Congress should thus repeal Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank, removing
the directive of Pay Ratio Disclosure, and direct the SEC to formulate a soft
pay cap system. The soft pay cap provides an opportunity to receive
bipartisan support and longevity. A soft pay cap provides a middle ground
compromise to an otherwise contentious issue. By allowing the SEC to
intervene in executive compensation, a soft pay cap would provide a backstop
to excessive compensation, but still allow an executive to steadily increase
their salary based on company success. An added benefit of a soft cap system
is that the executive and the shareholders are more closely aligned in their
collective interests. Importantly, a soft pay cap would not create further
burdens in the way the Pay Ratio Disclosure does; rather it would require the
utilization of information companies already keep on hand. A soft pay cap
thus provides a middle ground, promoting a more efficient regulation and the
freedom of capital formation. Though at first glance a soft pay cap might be
unwanted, such a system provides the greatest middle ground in achieving a
system of compensation that allows executives, shareholders, and society to
feel comfortable in this area of corporate law.
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